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997918e2f7 | ||
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2860f750b4 | ||
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3014a45936 |
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@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ creation_rules:
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- *admin
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- *lxc-tor-relay
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- path_regex: secrets/tailscale-router\.yaml$
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key_groups:
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- age:
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- *admin
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- *linode-tailscale-router
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- *lxc-tailscale-router
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- *proxmox-tailscale-router
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# gui-host-specific secrets (currently: wifi-password, see
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# modules/networking/wifi.nix). Only *lxc-gui has a registered key today
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# -- proxmox-gui/linode-gui/baremetal-gui haven't been provisioned via
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@@ -1,8 +1,19 @@
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_:
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{
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imports = [
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(import ../../modules/beszel/host-token.nix {
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name = "tailscale-router";
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sopsFile = ../../secrets/tailscale-router.yaml;
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})
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];
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networking.hostName = "tailscale-router";
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services.beszel.agent.environment = {
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KEY = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFPR9kwtC4TAeTRu46A7+opZsYpxqkRJ+x/ZyB2GWCeG";
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};
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# No networking.hostId: only ZFS-touching hosts (server, docker) need one
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# for pool-import safety, and this host does neither.
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
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{
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imports = [
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../tailscale/subnet-router.nix
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../beszel/enable-agent.nix
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];
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# "server", not "both": this build type advertises LAN subnet routes but
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@@ -16,27 +17,29 @@
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# Must also be approved in the Tailscale admin console (Machines → Edit route settings).
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services.tailscale.extraUpFlags = [ "--advertise-routes=${vars.lanCidr}" ];
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networking.firewall = {
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networking = {
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# SNAT traffic from LAN machines going out through Tailscale so the remote
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# peer sees it sourced from this router's Tailscale IP (100.x.x.x) rather
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# than a raw LAN IP. Without this, Tailscale drops the forwarded packets
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# because the source is not a recognised Tailscale address.
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#
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# networking.nat.externalInterface alone does not insert a MASQUERADE rule
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# (it only does so when internalInterfaces is also set). We use
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# extraCommands to add the rule into the nixos-nat-post chain that
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# networking.nat.enable creates, and extraStopCommands to clean it up.
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nat.enable = true;
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firewall = {
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# Forwarded subnet-router traffic arrives on tailscale0 already
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# tailscale-authenticated -- the firewall's normal per-port allow-list
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# would otherwise drop it. Standard NixOS/Tailscale subnet-router guidance.
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trustedInterfaces = [ "tailscale0" ];
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# SNAT LAN traffic going into Tailscale so the remote peer sees it as
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# coming from this router's Tailscale IP rather than a raw LAN IP.
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# Without this, Tailscale drops forwarded packets whose source is not a
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# recognised Tailscale address.
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#
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# We target POSTROUTING directly (always-existing built-in chain) rather
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# than nixos-nat-post: extraCommands runs after the old nixos-nat-post is
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# deleted but before the new one is created, so -A nixos-nat-post silently
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# fails. The -C check makes the rule idempotent across firewall reloads.
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extraCommands = ''
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iptables -t nat -C POSTROUTING -s ${vars.lanCidr} -o tailscale0 -j MASQUERADE 2>/dev/null || \
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iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s ${vars.lanCidr} -o tailscale0 -j MASQUERADE
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iptables -t nat -A nixos-nat-post -s ${vars.lanCidr} -o tailscale0 -j MASQUERADE
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'';
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extraStopCommands = ''
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iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s ${vars.lanCidr} -o tailscale0 -j MASQUERADE 2>/dev/null || true
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iptables -t nat -D nixos-nat-post -s ${vars.lanCidr} -o tailscale0 -j MASQUERADE 2>/dev/null || true
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'';
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};
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};
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}
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